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1. Faith and Social Existence: An Ecumenical Problematic 
This inquiry proposes a retrieval of Chalcedon’s (451 CE) classical Christology in 
response to a religious problematic of ecumenical breadth in the American context. 
Attention to a Christological theme cannot be disengaged from the totality of a doctrine 
of the Trinity, and especially of the Holy Spirit. But human discourse proceeds part by 
part, and attention to the mission of the Spirit internal to as well as distinct from that of 
the Son is not the main preoccupation here. Similarly, a study at greater length would 
have to address the problem of the extent to which Chalcedonian Christology has been 
and may still be held captive by ideologies operating in the interest of empire, nation, 
class, gender, or White supremacy.  
In defense of a very broad presupposition that Chalcedon can be extricated from 
ideology I would point to, for example, James Cone’s Black liberation theology in its 
affirmation of spirituals and gospel music as a legitimate locus theologicus and to the 
spirit of veneration for Christ human and divine they breathe, a spirit I would argue is 
congruent with Chalcedon.1 Similarly, Virgilio Elizondo’s explanation of mestizo religion 
																																																								
1 James H. Cone, Risks of Faith: The Emergence of a Black Theology of Liberation, 
1968-1998 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999).  See James H. Cone’s “Black Liberation 
Theology and Black Catholics: A Critical Conversation,” Theological Studies 61, 4 
(December 2000) 731-747 for his reiteration of a long-standing challenge to White 
Protestant and Catholic theologians in the United States to tackle White supremacy as a 
theological problem. In response see Laurie M. Cassidy and Alex Mikulich, editors, 
Interrupting White Privilege: Catholic Theologians Break the Silence (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 2007). On the difference between well-meant teaching against individual 
attitudes and analytic exposure of systemic distortion embedded in social structures and 
institutions, see Bryan Massingale, “James Cone and Recent Catholic Episcopal Teaching 
on Racism,” in Theological Studies 61, 4 (December 2000) 700-730.  
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and theology allows a glimpse into mestizo piety that likewise resonates positively with 
Chalcedon.2  It might be worth noting that according to Chalcedon’s teaching the	Logos	
cannot	be	defined	as	possessing	in	a	divine	nature	qualities	such	as	gender	that	
belong	to	a	human	nature.		It	goes	without	saying	that	the	divine	nature	of	the	Logos	
is	not	gendered,	not	male,	a	point	made	in	studies	of	Wisdom	Christology.	Jesus’	
human	nature	is	male.	In	Chalcedon’s	meaning	of	‘person’,	though	not	in	a	modern	
meaning,	it	would	be	accurate	to	say	that	Jesus	is	not	a	male	person	because	Jesus	is	
one	divine	person	(not	gendered)	in	two	natures,	divine	and	human	(male‐
gendered).	Jesus	is	a	non‐gendered	divine	person	with	a	gendered	human	nature.		
Affirmation	of	Chalcedon	does	not,	that	is,	necessarily	project	the	interests	of	a	
dominant	group,	thought	this	has	occurred	and	still	does. 
In the United States a larger, typically modern division between faith and 
everyday life surfaces in a chronic disjunction between sincere faith in people of good 
will on one hand and on the other hand the societal implications of their faith especially 
in the dimension of social justice. Preparation and dissemination of official social 
teachings by churches from the Catholic, Lutheran (ELCA), Presbyterian Church USA, 
Eastern Orthodox, American Baptist, to Evangelicals and some Pentecostals, have not 
overcome the disjunction.  
What is social justice? “Social justice concerns…the social, political, and 
economic aspects and, above all, the structural dimensions of problems and their 
respective solutions.”3 It analyzes the “functioning of the major public institutions of the 
social, legal, economic, or political orders.” It looks to “the structural requirements for a 
just society focused on the human rights and needs of each person.” 4   Social justice 
seeks to promote a societal condition in which all people, equal in dignity, enjoy 
																																																								
2 Virgilio Elizondo, Galilean Journey: The Mexican-American Promise (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1983-1993) and “Jesus the Galilean Jew in Mestizo Theology,” Theological 
Studies (June 2009) 262-281. 
3 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, English translation by the Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (Rome: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, 2004; Washington, D.C.: USCCB Publishing, 2005) n. 201, pp. 89/90. 
4 Brian Hehir, “Social Justice,” in Richard McBrien, general editor, HarperCollins 
Encyclopedia of Catholicism (New York: HarperCollins, 1995) 1203-4. 
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proportionally equal access to participation in the social, economic, cultural, civil, and 
political life of society. Insofar as changes are needed to bring this access about, 
commitment to social justice ordinarily leads to advocacy for specific public policies, an 
always controversial matter. In Bernard Lonergan’s analysis of the human good in 
Method in Theology social justice would seem equivalent to the good of order at the level 
of society, not of culture or of person.5 Robert Doran’s work has developed Lonergan’s 
analysis of the human good by elucidating a dialectic in society between practicality and 
intersubjective spontaneity.6 
The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church summarizes the 
importance of social justice for Catholic faith, stating that, “A large part of the Church’s 
social teaching is solicited and determined by important social questions, to which social 
justice is the proper answer.”7 Racial justice logically falls under social justice but has to 
be broken out because otherwise the distinctive menace of White supremacy cannot be 
seen in regard not only to Americans of African, Asian, and Latin descent but in regard to 
native Americans. Embedded within Catholic social teaching [CST], racial and social 
justice have proved difficult to listen to and to accept as belonging to faith. 8 
Why is that? A study of parishioners commissioned by the US Bishops in 1998 
reported that, “many Catholics do not understand that the social teaching of the Church is 
an essential part of Catholic faith.”9 One reason adduced was a perception that social 
doctrine was peripheral to the core of faith expressed in Eucharistic liturgy and in the 
																																																								
5 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Seabury Press, 1972). 
6 Robert M. Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1990) and What Is Systematic Theology? (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2005). 
7  Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, English translation by the Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church n. 81, p. 36. Surprisingly, 
reference to Justice in the World, the 1981 international Synod of Bishops’ statement on 
social justice belonging to the preaching of the gospel did not find its way into the 
Compendium. 
8 See Bryan N. Massingale, “James Cone and Recent Catholic Episcopal Teaching on 
Racism,” Theological Studies 61 (2000) 700-737. In the Compendium only 4 of 583 
paragraphs treat racism.   
9 United States Catholic Conference, Sharing Catholic Social Teaching: Challenges and 
Directions, Reflections of the U.S. Catholic Bishops (Washington, D.C.: USCC, 1998) 3. 
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Creed. A starting-point for remedies was, “the need to see more clearly Catholic social 
teaching as authentic doctrine and integral to the mission of Catholic education.”10 The 
Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church addressed that need with a papally 
authorized synthesis of CST that integrated social doctrine into the official doctrine of 
Catholic faith.  That integration is hopeful in principle. 
But in practice Jerome Baggett’s 2009 analysis of 300 interviews with members 
of 6 Catholic parishes in the San Francisco Bay area opens space for some doubt that a 
volume from the Pontifical Council for Peace and Justice will turn the tide in favor of 
wider reception of CST. 11 For one thing, in regard to CST Baggett found that “Catholics 
gain access to these idioms—concepts such as the ‘priority of labor over capital, human 
dignity, subsidiarity, the common good, a ‘preferential option for the poor’, distributive 
and social justice, stewardship of the earth’s resources, and ‘just war’ criteria—when they 
hear them used repeatedly.” 12 Indeed, he discovered that, “Some use social justice 
language to describe how institutions perpetuate racial inequality and therefore envision 
institution-level remedies.”13  But this is relatively a small number. More generally, 
“public discourse is occurring in parishes. But it is often undermined by a tendency 
toward civic silencing, whereby the idioms of the church’s social justice tradition are 
expressed less interactively, less incisively, and less regularly.”14  Parishioners, that is, 
have not assimilated CST, at least partly because its language, its idiom, is not coin of the 
realm. Faith expressed in liturgy, prayer, and profession of the Creed does not seem to 
involve a societal dimension and so can be classified sociologically as ‘privatized’. 
A condition not totally dissimilar can be found among many Americans in 
churches and movements stemming from the Reformation, despite Stanley Hauerwas’s 
alarm at social justice saturating Protestant consciences.15  Instead of churches’ social 
																																																								
10 United States Catholic Conference, Sharing Catholic Social Teaching, 3.  
11 Jerome Baggett, Sense of the Faithful: How American Catholics Live Their Faith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
12 Baggett, 186/7. 
13 Baggett, 189. 
14 Baggett, 187. 
15 For a helpful overview of Stanley Hauerwas’s contribution see R.R. Reno, “Stanley 
Hauerwas,” in Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, editors, The Blackwell Companion 
to Political Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004) 302-16.  
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teaching being a ‘best-kept secret’ as in Catholicism, according to Hauerwas social 
teachings have inundated Protestant clergy and laity, all but supplanting gospel and 
faith.16 Hauerwas laments that, “If there is anything Christians agree about today it is that 
our faith is one that does justice…We are told that justice demands that we must reshape 
and restructure society so that the structural injustices are eradicated forever.”17 In 
Hauerwas’s perspective Christian commitment to the cause of social justice has induced 
rather than overcome Christians’ cultural captivity by the market and the state. So he 
urges that churches should return from a social agenda to concentrate on renewing an 
ecclesial identity prior to and complete without a social mission. 18  Church witness to 
how Christ, gospel and faith transform social existence within the church will contribute 
more to the common good than seeking to intervene in or influence public matters. 
And yet he need not worry too much about Protestant conformity to an allegedly 
misguided message of social justice. The message has not been heard, or having been 
heard, has been ignored or resisted. Whichever the case, or a mix of the three, sociologist 
Brian Steensland found that from the 1960’s on mainline Protestants in the pews have 
distrusted official social teachings from the clerical leadership of churches and from the 
National Council of Churches. His explanation for the negative reaction is that Protestant 
faithful heard leaders and ecumenists advocating for and teaching racial and social justice 
for minorities and the poor in the language of policy analysis rather than invoking explicit 
																																																								
16 See, for example, Stanley Hauerwas, After Christendom: How the Church Is to Behave 
If Freedom, Justice, and a Christian Nation Are Bad Ideas (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1991/1999).  
17 Hauerwas, After Christendom, 45. 
18 For an objection to interest in social justice by all religions, not only Christianity, see 
Shivesh C. Thakur, Religion and Social Justice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). 
Thakur argues against religious concern for social justice because “religion’s ultimate 
goal, namely the transcendental state of spiritual salvation or liberation…must regard 
earthly matters as ‘ultimately inconsequential’,” 44.  See the Presbyterian Church 
USA’s 1954 statement of theological principles for social action: “Religion is about 
life in its wholeness,” Presbyterian Church USA, Compilation of Social Policy, Chapter 
One, “Theological Basis for Social Action…1954 statement,” 
(http://index.pcusa.org/NXT/gateway.dll/socialpolicy/chapter00000.htm?fn=default.htm$
f=templates$3.0). 
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theological and moral justifications.19 The result was a back-lash from 1964 to 2000 
against an ecumenical social agenda associated with the headquarters and church 
memberships in the National Council of Churches USA.20  There is no empirical data on 
Eastern and Oriental Orthodox churches in America but it would be surprising if the 
situation were not the same there.  
A sociological study by James D. Davidson and Ralph E. Pyle confirms the 
ecumenical breadth of a disconnect between faith and social justice.  They discovered 
that in Catholic and Protestant congregations between 1965 and 1995, a period when the 
gap between rich and poor had been increasing, congregations allocated funds, staff time, 
and selected themes for preaching and hymns more in congruence with a ‘good fortune 
theology’ celebrating God’s goodness to the prosperous than a ‘social justice theology’ 
prophetically addressing the widening gap between rich and poor. 21  That finding 
contravenes Hauerwas’s contention that a wave of social justice rolled across Protestant 
America. Or if it did, then unbeknownst to him, a simultaneous and ubiquitous movement 
rolled it back.   
To give their due to Hauerwas and those mainline American Protestants rejecting 
a social agenda, perhaps some advocates of Christian commitment to racial and social 
justice had conveyed what was received as an implicit secularization of the gospel that 
																																																								
19 Brian Steensland, “The Hydra and the Swords:  Social Welfare and Mainline 
Advocacy, 1964-2000,” in Robert Wuthnow and John C. Evans, editors, The Quiet Hand 
of God: Faith-Based Activism and the Public Role of Mainline Protestantism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002) 213-236. 
20 For an example of pre-1960’s social teaching see the Presbyterian Church USA’s 
1954 statement of theological principles for social action: “Religion is about life in its 
wholeness,” Presbyterian Church USA, Compilation of Social Policy, Chapter One, 
“Theological Basis for Social Action…1954 statement,” 
(http://index.pcusa.org/NXT/gateway.dll/socialpolicy/chapter00000.htm?fn=default.htm$
f=templates$3.0). 
21 James D. Davidson and Ralph E. Pyle, “Public Religion and Economic Inequality,” in 
William H. Swatos, Jr, and James K. Wellman, Jr. editors, The Power of Religious 
Publics: Staking Claims in American Society (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1999) 
101-14. Their investigation of congregational responses to an increasing gap between rich 
and poor in the US 1965-95 used a spectrum between good fortune theology celebrating 
God’s material blessings on the righteous and social justice theology calling for more 
equitable distribution of resources. Few were at either the extreme but more were toward 
the ‘good fortune’ end. 
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portrayed a temporal order of socio-politically institutionalized justice as the central 
objective in the mission of Christ. Some interpretations of the Jesus of history as a 
prophet of social change have gone in that direction, and been criticized for it by other 
exegetes.22 Perhaps Hauerwas has articulated a broad-based recoil in American 
Protestantism against a surmised assumption that social justice is the novum of the 
mission of Christ, the be-all and end-all of Christianity. No official social teaching from 
any church makes a claim that can be understood to state that. But reception cannot be 
controlled by the texts alone.  
At the same time many but not all Black churches have a tradition of rich social 
teaching and preaching that links faith with a deprivatized commitment to practice of 
racial and social justice.23 Still, my limited collaboration with gifted Black Protestant 
laity and pastors suggests another kind of problem stemming from congregational 
independence in the free-church and Pentecostal traditions.  Side-by-side practice of 
worship and practice of commitment to racial and social justice flourish. But within and 
among independent congregations there is not widespread consent to any specific 
articulation of a strong theological bond joining the two practices of discipleship so that 
for some congregants theological doubt hovers around commitments to practical 
activities for racial and social justice. On the other hand, though far less numerous than 
their Protestant counter-parts, Black Catholics in principle and practice have sustained a 
strong public record in support of the social tradition and documentary heritage of CST 
on racial and social justice.24 The deprivatized faith of Black Catholic clergy and laity 
																																																								
22 See Ben Witherington III, The Jesus Quest: The Third Search for the Jew of Nazareth, 
Second Edition (Downer’s Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1997) 64-92 in criticism of John 
Dominic Crossan and 137-160 in criticism of Gerd Theissen, Richard Horsley, and R. 
David Kaylor. Also see N.T. Wright, The Contemporary Quest for Jesus (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2002; an excerpt from Jesus and the Victory of God, 1996). 
23  See Peter Paris, The Social Teaching of the Black Churches (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1985) and Andrew Billingsley, Mighty Like a River: The Black Church and Social 
Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For an example of a charismatic leader 
see a special issue of the Presbyterian Church USA’s periodical, Hungry Hearts, Vol. 
XIII (Fall 2003) devoted to “Howard Thurman: Shaping Spirituality from Love to 
Justice,” accessible by way of ‘Hungry Hearts’, and ‘browse back issues’ at 
http://gamc.pcusa.org/ministries/spiritualformation/. 
24 See the articles in the issue dedicated to “Catholic Reception of Black Theology,” 
Theological Studies, 61 (Dec. 2000), and Bryan Massingale, author for Catholic Charities 
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exemplifies fidelity to what Andrew Greeley identified as the Catholic imagination 
underlying CST.25 
The argument to follow will not presuppose that Christ’s humanity is primarily 
instrumentum justitiae temporalis rather than instrumentum salutis. It will be that social 
justice is inherent in the normative social vision and practice carried in Christianity’s 
effective, constitutive, and cognitive meanings. What is at stake is who Christ is as well 
as what he taught by word and deed as Scripture and tradition relay the Christ-event to 
succeeding generations in the church. Value-judgments about social justice flow from 
truths of faith, the theological-anthropological truth that human beings are created in the 
image of God, the ecclesiological truth that the church has an orientation beyond herself 
to the rest of humanity, and the Christological truth confessed at Chalcedon, that Jesus 
the Christ is the eternal Word of God in two distinct natures, human and divine. Explicit 
statement that the Word is a distinct, divine person came only with III Constantinople 
(680/1 CE). 
2.  Framing Reception of Chalcedon: Revision or Appropriation?  
Presuming that God’s grace is ever-offered and can be affirmed to be independent 
of human thought or agency, there is room for theology as the thinking of faith to assist 
grace-led reception of social teachings and social justice.  Theology’s contribution to 
conversion to approval for racial and social justice involves more than invaluable, on-
going New Testament exegeses and indispensable studies in social ethics. Unexpectedly 
perhaps, systematic theology in the area of Christology also has something to offer in the 
form of recourse to the question posed by Jesus during his public ministry, “who do you 
say that I am?”  and to the answer as taught by the Council of Chalcedon (451 CE) in 
conjunction with the Third Council of Constantinople (680/1 CE). 
Delving into ideas of Christ at issue in discipleship’s relation to society at large 
places the inquiry within public theology, an area that fulfills part of a large theological 
																																																																																																																																																																					
USA, Poverty and Racism: Overlapping Threats to the Common Good (Washington 
D.C.: 2007).  
25 See Andrew Greeley, The Catholic Imagination (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000). Greeley long has doubted and denied the efficacy of documentary 
communication of CST and argues for the primacy of a Catholic imagination transmitted 
by example, story, and liturgy that generated CST in the first place. 
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task outlined by Bernard Lonergan in chapter 14 of Method in Theology. Called 
communications, Lonergan’s method for practical theology fulfills systematics and 
completes the mutual mediation between religion and a cultural matrix. Communications 
looks to more than how to pass on already attained systematic understandings to 
catechists, preachers, clergy, and missionaries. Communications also puts systematic 
theology in dialogue with other disciplines, with ecumenism, and with renewal of 
common meaning in church and society. Questions about church and society also may 
incite a reverse movement of inquiry back to systematics before coming home again to 
communications. Such, at least, is the structure of this inquiry: from a question in the life 
of the church to systematic Christology, and then back to engaging theology in the life of 
the church and through the church in the life of society. 
The return to systematics will retrieve and develop, not revise or reformulate, 
Chalcedon’s classical affirmation of Christ’s two natures, human and divine, in the Son 
of God Whom III Constantinople made explicit was a divine person. Also, ecumenical 
consensus on the divinity of Christ grounds the accessibility of this argument to most not 
all Protestant traditions and affirmation of Christ’s divinity figures in the criterion for 
membership in the World Council of Churches. Baptist rejection of creeds and 
confessions nonetheless does not depart from convictions ccongruent with the early 
councils including Chalcedon and III Constantinople. Oriental Orthodox non-affirmation 
of Chalcedon has to do with historical, linguistic, religious, theological and cultural 
contexts but arguably does not oppose the Christological belief confessed at Chalcedon.  
However, many theologians think that Christology has been one-sidedly ‘from 
above’ ever since Chalcedon, though Eastern theologians have been more likely to notice 
that Western faith, piety, and theology have orbited around the humanity of Jesus.26 It 
may well be the case that an undercurrent in Western Christianity apart from doctrine and 
theology has been an unofficial, imaginative construal of Jesus that begins and ends with 
																																																								
26 See the remark that, “The fact remains that later Christology has often tended to 
absolutize Chalcedon, as though it constituted the absolute point of reference, thus 
overlooking the relational nature of the conciliar Christology in regard to that of the New 
Testament,” in Jacques Dupuis, Who Do You Say That I Am?: Introduction to 
Christology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994) 105. 
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a doctrinal proposition that “Jesus is God.” Roger Haight thinks that this approach to 
Christ is “an imaginative framework that controls the reading of the gospel accounts of 
Jesus…a doctrinal imagination.”27  And yet after more than two centuries of historical 
searches for the historical Jesus there is something to be said for the Eastern perception of 
a one-sided affirmation of the humanity of Jesus, and for Western currents of thought and 
spirituality more eager to be clear that “Jesus is a man” than that he is also divine. In fact, 
Richard Norris Jr. describes “a new type of Monophysitism—a tendency, in the face of 
its own strong sense of the incompatibility of divine and human agencies, to reduce 
Christ not to a God fitted out with the vestiges of humanity but to a human being adorned 
with the vestiges of divinity.” 28  Belgian theologian Jacques Dupuis (1923-2003) noticed 
the same tendency, calling it an “ ‘inverted monophysitism’—that supposes a certain 
absorption of the divine nature by the human, by which the divine nature is reduced to the 
measure of the human.”29 In Christology if not in piety “ ‘inverted monophysitism’” 
seems to have had more influence than Haight’s “doctrinal imagination.” 
In that case recovering and developing theological reflection on Christ’s divinity 
seeks to regain the mystery of the whole Christ-event in an era more given to 
preoccupation with hypotheses from the Third Quest for the Historical Jesus. 
Counteracting “inverted monophysitism” does not consist in adopting Cyril of 
Alexandria’s pre-Chalcedonian focus on the divinity of Christ as if ignoring explicit 
affirmation of two natures. Rather, going beyond a new monophysitism begins with the 
principle that all Christology arises and remains within the structure of the whole, 
historical Christ-event including the incarnation, resurrection, ascension, and Pentecost, 
to which the New Testament bears written witness. In Christology today arguably it is the 
divinity of Christ that has fallen out of theological reflection on the whole Christ-event. 
																																																								
27 Roger Haight, The Future of Christology (New York: Continuum Books, 2005) 20. 
28 Richard Norris, Jr., “Chalcedon Revisited: Historical and Theological Reflection,” in 
Bradley Nassif, editor, New Perspectives on Historical Theology: Essays in Memory of 
John Meyendorff (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1996) 140-159 at 155. 
29 Jacques Dupuis, “Universality of the Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ,” in Daniel 
Kendall, S.J. and Stephen Davis, editors, The Convergence of Theology: A Festschrift 
Honoring Gerald O’Collins, S.J., (NY, Paulist Press, 2001) 320-342 at 333.  
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Recovery and development of reflection on Christ’s divinity do not lack footing in 
one area of contemporary New Testament research. Larry Hurtado, for example, has 
shown in Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity that early, Jewish, 
monotheistic, reverence for Jesus as somehow divine was an incipient movement ‘from 
below’ to ‘above’ in the Synoptics. And a pre-Johannine Paul already was moving back 
‘from above’ to below.30 A presupposition of permanent principle not discussed here is 
that in the New Testament, and in Christianity both the church’s and individuals’ faith in 
Christ and Christology have the structure of a circle continually revolving ‘from below’ 
in Christ’s pre-resurrection humanity to ‘above’ in his incarnation and risen humanity 
united to his divinity, and back to his pre-resurrection humanity, all the while rolling 
forward under the impulse of new questions and insights in successive historical and  
cultural contexts.  
At the same time Roger Haight’s Jesus the Symbol of God casts doubt on the 
validity of any recourse to Chalcedon that retrieves its teaching for appropriation rather 
than revises it for reformulation. 31 Haight prescribes the importance, and I agree, of 
Christology addressing “the humanly caused and systematically ingrained human 
suffering that so characterizes our world situation today.”32 He insists too that the 
postmodern situation changes the whole problematic in a theology of Christ by moving it 
																																																								
30 Larry Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003). See important discussions by 
Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies of the 
New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2008) and James D. G. Dunn, Did the First Christians Worship 
Jesus? The New Testament Evidence (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 
2010). 
31 Roger Haight, Jesus: Symbol of God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, second edition, 
2000). There is some affinity between Haight’s project and that of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher in The Christian Faith in that both propose an affirming of the divinity of 
Christ without locating that divinity in the subsistent Logos. See, however, Richard 
Muller “The Christological Problem as Addressed by Friedrich Schleiermacher: A 
Dogmatic Inquiry,” in Marguerite Schuster and Richard Muller, editors, Perspectives in 
Chhristology: Essays in Honor of Paul K. Jewett (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan 
Publsihing House, 1991) 141-162. In Muller’s view Schleiermacher’s “absolutely 
powerful God-consciousness” in Jesus did not intend to deny Chalcedon on Logos in 
Jesus, 142. Haight’s revision does deny the subsistent Logos. 
32 Haight, Jesus, 25. 
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to a new starting-point in the “historical appearance of the historical person, Jesus of 
Nazareth within the new horizon of historical consciousness. The supposition and point 
of departure are defined by the human being, Jesus, and the question concerns what it can 
mean to say that Jesus is divine.”33 Here my agreement is qualified by recognition that 
New Testament research has shown that this was already a key question raised and 
answered within the New Testament and in the early ecumenical councils and is not a 
uniquely postmodern query.  
With admirable hermeneutical attention to context Haight acknowledges that 
Chalcedon made sense within the classical framework of late antiquity. But he goes on to 
argue that, “the shift to a historical imagination and point of departure undercuts the 
plausibility of the Johannine framework which in turn dictated the metaphysics of the 
divine subject, persona, and hypostasis.”34  With that position I strongly disagree, not 
least because he ignores the heuristic not metaphysical quality of Chalcedonian concepts, 
and because his reading of the Prologue to John’s Gospel is, I submit, simply mistaken in 
denying affirmation of the pre-existent Logos in favor of a metaphoric interpretation of 
the Logos as a personified divine attribute. 35 Chalcedon, he holds, simply confuses when 
what’s needed first of all is re-instating an original meaning that had nothing to do with a 
																																																								
33  Haight, 291. 
34  Haight, 292. 
35 To label Chalcedon’s categories, person and nature, ‘metaphysical’ is to attribute to 
them a precision and systematic denotation they did not possess. Metaphysical 
elucidation of Chalcedon was the work of Scholasticism not part of the council in 451 
CE. See Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns 
Scotus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). On the undefined, heuristic quality of 
the concepts see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “The Origins of Christian Realism,” the 
Seventeenth Annual Robert Cardinal Bellarmine Lecture, St. Louis School of Divinity, 
September 27,1972 in Bernard J. Tyrell, S.J. and William F.J. Ryan, S.J., editors, A 
Second Collection (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974). Similarly, Sarah Coakley 
praises Richard A. Norris, amid several criticisms, for insisting that ‘nature’ and ‘person’ 
in Chalcedon’s Definition of Faith were relatively undefined so that the document is 
somewhat open-ended, “What Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does It Not? Some 
Reflections on the Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian ‘Definition’,” in Davis, 
Kendall, and O’Collins, editors, The Incarnation, 148. Coakley proposes that the 
Definition has an apophatic character, or what also might be called a mystogogical 
tendency, that in Eastern Orthodoxy led to its incorporation into the divine liturgy. This is 
true but does not remove a potential for kataphatic development of the sort that transpired 
until III Constantinople, and beyond. 
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divine person in order to reformulate Chalcedon’s teaching away from the pre-existent 
Logos as a distinct divine person. In Haight’s view Christology oriented toward social 
justice and minimizing avoidable human suffering simply has no path forward except to 
revise and reformulate Chalcedon. 
Without denying the validity of taking up reformulation of Chalcedon’s meaning, 
and without now discussing the merits or not of Haight’s reconstruction of Chalcedon’s 
original meaning and reformulation of it, an alternative priority accepted here flows in 
another current of Christology. That current includes, for example, Gerald O’ Collins’s 
Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of Jesus, the Christological 
principle in Jacques Dupuis’s theology of religious pluralism, Mark Noll’s Turning 
Points: Decisive Moments in Christian History, contributors to The Incarnation: An 
Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God edited by Stephen 
Davis, Gerald O’Collins, and Daniel Kendall, Kathryn Tanner’s Jesus, Humanity And 
Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology, Veli-Matt Karkäinen’s Christology: A Global 
Introduction, commentary and notes in Richard Price and Michael Gaddis’s new edition 
and translation of the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, Thomas Torrance’s Incarnation: 
The Person and Life of Christ, and Oliver Crisp’s Divinity and Humanity: The 
Incarnation Reconsidered, and God Incarnate: Explorations in Christology .36  These 
authors recognize the contextual, linguistic, conceptual differences between Chalcedon 
																																																								
36 Gerald O’Collins S.J. Christology: A Biblical, Historical, and Systematic Study of 
Jesus , Second Editon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 2009); Mark Noll, 
Turning Points: Decisive Moments in Christian History (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 
1997); Jacques Dupuis, S.J., Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997); Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001, 2003); Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, S.J., 
Gerald O’Collins, S.J. editors, The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the 
Incarnation of the Son of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pbk. 2004, originally 
2002); Veli-Matti Kärkäinen, Christology: A Global Introduction (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic Books, 2005; originally 2003); Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, editors and 
translators, with an introduction and notes by Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, Acts of 
the Council of Chalcedon: Volumes 1, 2, and 3 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
2007); Thomas Torrance, edited by Robert T. Walker, The Incarnation: The Person and 
Life of Christ (Downer’s Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008); Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and 
Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) and God Incarnate: Explorations in Christology (London: T & T Clark, 2009). 
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and ourselves as grounds for keeping Chalcedon open to reformulation yet they accord 
precedence to expounding its teaching. Why would they do that? O’Collins says carefully 
and I concur, “I have clearly credited the teaching of Chalcedon with at least a certain 
intelligibility and ongoing validity.”37 Declares Noll, and I agree, Chalcedon’s Definition 
of Faith “retains its momentous significance” because “the statement faithfully represents 
the reality about which it speaks.” 38  
3.  Appropriating Chalcedon 
Now back to Chalcedon. A visit to contemporary Istanbul, tourists are advised, is 
best in September or October in order to avoid the broiling summer sun of July and 
August.  Things were not so different on Thursday October 25, 451 CE when 370 bishops 
assembled at Chalcedon a bit north of present-day Istanbul on the eastern sea-coast of the 
Bosphorus to sign and acclaim a Definition of the Faith they had produced three days 
earlier in session five. 39  The nucleus of that Definition (Latin: definitio; Greek: horos) 
confessed that, 
one and the same Christ, Son, Lord,  Only-begotten, acknowledged  
in two natures without confusion [asugkutos], change [atreptos], 
division [adiairetos],  or separation [achoristos] (the difference of 
the natures being in no way destroyed by the union, but rather the 
distinctive character of each nature being preserved, and coming 
together into one person and one hypostasis [hypostasis]) not 
																																																								
37 O’Collins, Christology, 245. 
38 Noll, Turning Points, 81. 
39 Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, editors and translators, with an introduction and 
notes by Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, Acts of the Council of Chalcedon: Volumes 
1, 2, and 3 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007). See Table 3. Chronology of the 
Sessions of the Council of Chalcedon in General Introduction, The Acts of the Council of 
Chalcedon: Volume 1, 183-205.  The Fifth Session, The Acts of the Council of 
Chalcedon: Volume 2. See Price and Gaddis, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon: 
Volume 3, Appendix II: Attendance and Ecumenicity, 193-203. Emperor Marcian’s 
Fourth Edict had 520 bishops attending. Most likely 320 bishops attended, along with 
some priests serving as proxies for others, so the number of votes cast differed from the 
number in attendance.. 
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parted or divided into two persons but one and the same Son, 
Only-begotten, God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ…. 40 
In Part V of the General Introduction, Richard Price supports a modern interpretation of 
this Definition as a teaching shaped by Cyril of Alexandria, with moderating Antiochene 
affirmation of two natures after the Incarnation. 41 He rejects the interpretation that 
Chalcedon synthesized Antiochene and Alexandrian tendencies, or forged a compromise 
between them.  I see no reason to disagree with Price. In Jesus the Symbol of God 
nonetheless, Haight at one point speaks of Chalcedon as a compromise and a synthesis of 
the two schools of thought. Yet eventually he concludes that, “the Alexandrian 
framework controls the whole vision.”42  He sees the Alexandrian framework as 
problematic, however. It conceived the Logos as a subsistent person rather than as an 
attribute of Christ.  
For Haight the Cyrillian problem stemmed from a patristic tradition of mistaken 
interpretations of the Prologue to John’s Gospel that misread poetic, metaphoric language 
about divine attributes as propositions about a distinct entity, the Logos. To counteract 
Chalcedon’s Cyrillian concept of the Logos as a divine person Haight undertakes 
retrieval of Antiochene affirmation of Christ’s two natures.  Dupuis and this inquiry 
emphasize the two natures but in support of not in opposition to Cyrillian and 
Chalcedonian affirmation of the person of the Logos.  True enough, attention to the two 
																																																								
40 The Fifth Session, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon: Volume 2, Price and Gaddis, 
183-205 at 204.  For the Greek text, see Eduard Schwartz, Acta Conciliorum 
Oecumenicorum II, Gesta Actionum III-VII (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1933) 69-163 at 
129. The English word ‘definition’ and Latin word ‘definitio’ translate the Greek term 
horos. Sarah Coakley discusses horos in light of Greek usage, and selects the meaning of 
‘pattern’ or ‘grid’ so that the Definition is a “transitional ‘horizon’ to which we 
constantly return, but with equally constant forays backwards and forwards,” in “What 
Does Chalcdon Solve and What Does It Not? Some Reflections on the Status and 
Meaning of the Chalcedonian ‘Definition’,” in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, S.J., 
Gerald O’Collins, S.J. editors, The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the 
Incarnation of the Son of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pbk. 2004, originally 
2002) 143-163 at 161-2. 
41 See Richard Price’s discussion of Chalcedon’s Definition of Faith in “V. The Theology 
of Chalcedon,” General Introduction, Price and Gaddis, The Acts of the Council of 
Chalcedon: Volume 1, 56-75. 
42 Haight, Jesus, 288. 
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natures of Christ usually serves to keep the historical humanity of Jesus to the fore lest it 
be thought of as dissolved into, overwhelmed, or rendered negligible by his divinity. 
However, Chalcedon’s distinction of natures equally well directs attention to the divine 
nature of Christ. That is the path taken by Jacques Dupuis and I will follow in his 
footsteps then strike out in another direction.43  
Dupuis highlights Christ’s divine nature in a marvelous theology of religious 
pluralism. 44 In a series of writings from 1991 to 2001, Dupuis distinguished two aspects 
of the divine nature of Jesus, the Logos/Son of God incarnate.45  The most familiar aspect 
is the Logos ensarkos, Jesus the Logos as enfleshed or incarnate, historically causative of 
and immanent in the visible economy of redemption and Christianity as its sacrament. 
The less familiar aspect of the divine nature of Jesus is the Logos as asarkos (unfleshed 
or non-incarnate). The eternal Logos pre-existent to the Incarnation was asarkos.46 After 
																																																								
43 See “A Bibliography of the Writings of Jacques Dupuis, S.J.,” and Gerald O’Collins, 
S.J., “Jacques Dupuis: His Person and Work,” in Daniel Kendall and Gerald O’ Collins, 
editors, In Many and Diverse Ways: In Honor of Jacques Dupuis (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 2003) 231-269 and 18-29 respectively.  
44 Among others, Jacques Dupuis, S.J., Jesus Christ at the Encounter of World Religions, 
translated by R. R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991; originally Jésus Christ à la 
rencontre des religions, Paris: Desclée, 1989); Who Do You Say That I Am?: Introduction 
to Christology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Book, 1994-2001; translated by Orbis Books, 
Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 2002; originally Il cristianesimo e le religioni: Dallo scontro all’ incontro 
[Brescia: Edizioni Queriniania, 2001]); Toward a Christian Theology of Religious 
Pluralism, (Maryknoll, NY, Orbis Press, 1997-2002); “Trinitarian Christology as a 
Model for a Theology of Religious Pluralism,” in T. Merrigan and J. Haers, editors, The 
Myriad Christ: Pluralism and the Quest for Unity in Contemporary Christology (Leuven, 
Belgium: University Press, 2000) 83-97; “Le Verbe de Dieu Jesus Christ et les religions 
du monde,” in Nouvelle revue théologique, 123/4 (2001) 529-546;  “Universality of the 
Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ,” in Daniel Kendall, S.J. and Stephen Davis (eds.), 
The Convergence of Theology: A Festschrift Honoring Gerald O’Collins, S.J., (NY, 
Paulist Press, 2001) 320-342. 
45 See especially Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, ch. 1 
“The Cosmic Christ in the Early Fathers,” ch.11, “Jesus Christ-One and Universal,” and 
“Universality of the Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ” in Kendall, et al. editors, The 
Convergence of Theology.  
46 On difficulties in thinking of ‘pre’- existence see Brian Leftow, “A Timeless God 
Incarnate,” in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, S.J., and Gerald O’Collins, S.J. editors, 
The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 273-299. 
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the Incarnation, asarkos simply refers to the fact that the hypostatically united human 
nature of Jesus cannot possibly ‘contain’, participate in, receive, or mediate the totality of 
Christ’s divine nature. Dupuis states that, “The divine action of the Word is not 
‘circumscribed’ by, ‘exhausted’ by, or ‘reduced’ to its expression through human 
nature.”47  This is to say that the divine nature does not turn into a non-divine nature.  
He expands on the transcendence of Christ’s divine to his human nature in noting 
that, “The action of the Word reaches beyond the limits imposed on the operative 
presence of the humanity of Jesus, even in its glorified state, just as the person of the 
Word exceeds the human nature of Christ, the hypostatic union notwithstanding.” 48 This 
recognition of difference and divine excess is not only allowable but compelled by the 
Definition of Chalcedon.49 It has been orthodox theology of the Incarnation since 
Athanasius in the fourth century.50   
Though Dupuis nowhere discusses the Reformation, it is the case that Luther and 
early Lutheran theologians took exception to Jean Calvin’s assertion of the transcendence 
of Christ’s divine nature in the Institutes of Christian Religion.51 Lutheran celebration of 
and communion in the Eucharist in multiple places and times seemed to require that 
Christ’s glorified bodiliness be omnipresent if Christ is really present in the Eucharist. 
Lutheran teaching on the communicatio idiomatum accordingly attributed, or in the term 
of Oliver Crisp, ‘transferred’ divine omnipresence to Christ’s risen and glorified human 
																																																								
47 Dupuis, “Universality of the Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ,” 334. 
48 Dupuis, “Universality of the Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ,” 338. 
49 Dupuis, “Universality of the Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ,” 332.  
50 Besides Athanasius, see Origen, Contra Celsum II, 9; Cyril of Alexandria, Letter to 
Nestorius (12 Anathemas), 9; Theodore of Mopsuestia, Ex Libris de Incarnatione, VII; 
Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio III, 10, 30; Letter 137, to Volusianus; De Peccatorum 
Meritis et Remissione, I, 60 (31); John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa, III, 7; Peter 
Lombard, Sententiarum III, d. 22, 3; Thomas Aquinas, In Sententiarum, II, 22, Q. I, a. 2; 
Summa Theologiae, IIIa, Q. 10, a. 1, ad 2. 
51 E. David Willis remarks in Calvin’s Catholic Christology: The Function of the So-
Called Extra Calvinisticum in Calvin’s Theology (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966) that, “There 
are two passages in the Institutes which are commonly accepted as Calvin’s classical 
statements of the ‘extra Calvinisticum’. These are II, 13, 4 and IV, 17, 30 of the 1559 
edition,” 26.   
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nature.52  Lutheran theologians objected to Calvin’s affirmation of a surplus or excess in 
Christ’s divine nature over his human nature in the famous vocabulary of the ‘extra 
Calvinisticum’, the ‘Calvinist extra’.53 
In surveying the world’s religions from a Christian viewpoint Dupuis merely 
points out that the divine nature of Jesus exceeds the powers and capacities of Jesus’ 
human nature as greatly as the divine exceeds the human. After 1994 instead of an 
ensarkos/asarkos distinction in regard to Christ’s divine nature Dupuis spoke about the 
universality of the Logos and the particularity of Jesus. His focus was on the universal 
enlightening influence of the Logos described in John 1: 9: “The true Light, which 
enlightens everyone, was coming into the world.”  The pre-existent divine Logos 
enlightened all people prior to the Incarnation.54 Dupuis then adds that this universal 
enlightening which is a saving influence did not cease because of the Incarnation and 
continues after the Incarnation but not through, not only through, the mediation of the 
human nature and activities of Jesus.   
																																																								
52 Oliver D. Crisp, Divinity and Humanity: The Incarnation Reconsidered (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 6-26.  
53 See Paul Helm, Calvin at the Centre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 114-128. 
Helm points out that Calvin understood the transcendence of the divine nature to the 
human nature of Jesus to lead to rejection of the omnipresence of the human nature of 
Jesus. Calvin approved a scholastic distinction, “Although the whole Christ [totus] is 
everywhere, yet everything which is in him [totum, ie his human nature] is not 
everywhere,” Institutes of Religion, II, 13, 4, quoted in Helm, 116. Helm comments that, 
“If that distinction had been observed, then, Calvin thinks, it would have ruled out the 
doctrine of transubstantiation,” 116. 
54 Dupuis does not refer to Aquinas’s interpretation of John 1:9. But see St. Thomas 
Aquinas, edited by James A. Weisheipl, O.P. and Fabian R. Larcher, O.P., Commentary 
on the Gospel of St. John, Part I (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1980) Lecture 5, 69-76 at 
71/2. Aquinas explains the enlightening as divine, as the Word, “light by his essence,” 
Who before the Incarnation “enlightens every man,” by the light of natural knowledge 
through participating in this true light which is the source of all the light of natural 
knowledge participated in by men.” Contrarily, Aquinas notes, the enlightening can be 
understood to mean the light of grace. Origen understood “enlightens” to mean the grace 
of faith admitting people to the world of Christ and Church. Chrysostom understands 
“enlightens” to be equivalent to wanting all to come to knowledge of the truth about God 
and be saved. Augustine explains the enlightening as the effect of the Word but only in 
those who receive the light of saving knowledge from Christ in a dark and perverse 
world, 72-73. 
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Dupuis did not edge away from the particularity and centrality of the fullness of 
light from the Logos in and through the whole Christ-event. Still, Chalcedon’s 
affirmation of two distinct natures unchanged by their union means that the operations 
proper to each nature, more clearly taught by III Constantinople (680/1) against 
monothelitism, do not disappear because of the hypostatic union.  But one of the powers 
proper to the Logos is enlightening all people. Therefore after the Incarnation too the 
eternal Logos continues to be universally influential and enlightening directly by his 
divine nature and not only through the human nature of Jesus active in his ministry, 
mission, teaching, death and resurrection and in the redemption visible and 
communicable in the churches and historical Christianity.  
Dupuis concluded that the universally operative Logos enlightens and inspires 
founders and adherents of non-Christian religions at the same time as the same Logos as 
incarnate fulfills that enlightening and in divine love becomes present as redeemer within 
a humanity that was created through ‘him’ in the first place. As divine Word incarnate 
Jesus the Christ is at once the particular, historical man who taught, suffered, died and 
rose from the dead and the universal Logos immanent in and active upon the cosmos, 
within human history, and in the lives of non-Christians.  
In defending Dupuis against some theologians’ misreadings, Gerald O’Collins 
pointed out that Dupuis’s texts did not separate the universal Logos from the incarnate 
Logos. Instead, maintained O’Collins, “What Dupuis has consistently argued is that 
within the one person of Jesus Christ we must distinguish the operations of his 
(uncreated) divine nature and his (created) human nature. Here he lines up,” O’ Collins 
continued, “with St. Thomas Aquinas who championed the oneness of Christ’s person but 
also had to recognize that Christ’s divine nature infinitely transcends his human nature 
(divina natura in infinitum humanam excedit), Summa Contra Gentiles, 4, 35,8.” 55 
Dupuis was arguing that Chalcedonian affirmation of Jesus’ divine nature means, 
O’Collins said, that “the Word’s divine operations are not canceled or restricted by his 
																																																								
55 Gerald O’Collins, “Jacques Dupuis: His Person and Work,” 24. Quotation also from an 
electronic version of Gerald O’Collins’s “The Dupuis Case,” gratefully received in an 
email from Daniel Kendall, 10/13/10. 
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assumption of a human existence that has now been glorified through the resurrection.”56 
I will follow Dupuis’s distinction between the original, invisible, constant, and universal 
divine operation of the Logos as Creator and the particular though central and 
eschatologically universal Jesus of Nazareth. 
4. The Logos:  Ultimate Source of Social Justice 
The distinction and affirmation of Jesus’ divine nature can be turned from the 
nature/grace question of God’s saving action in non-Christian religions to the origin of 
social justice in the Creator/creature relationship. Dupuis once mentioned “mediation in 
creation” by the Logos as an act that transcends the human nature of Jesus. 57 Yet he 
never explored the theological consequences of Logos as creating.  Six steps into those 
consequences are the following. First, seven New Testament passages tell of the Logos’s 
(John 1: 1-4) and Christ’s divine agency in creating (1 Cor. 8:6, 2 Cor. 5:17, Eph. 2:15, 
Col. 1:15-20, Heb. 1: 1-4, and Rev. 3:14).  This became a standard, formal part of church 
tradition enshrined in creedal profession that, “Through him all things have come to be.”  
The second step is realization that the creating agency of the Logos did not, could 
not, cease and desist at the Incarnation. Indeed and to the contrary, Paul proclaimed that, 
“There is one Lord Jesus Christ through whom all things come and through whom we 
exist,” (1 Corinthians 8:6) and Hebrews 1: 3 exclaimed about Jesus “sustaining the 
universe by his powerful command.” 58  These statements attribute creating to Jesus, it is 
true. How could that be, since Jesus is a visible human being? John’s Gospel provided the 
answer, the self-evidently human Jesus not only acted with divine authority and rose in 
divine power but is the divine Logos who became flesh. 
																																																								
56 O’Collins, “Jacques Dupuis,” 26. 
57 Dupuis, “Universality of the Word and Particularity of Jesus Christ,” 334. 
58 O’Collins observes that Pauline and deuteropauline letters attributed creation to Christ 
(1 Corinthians 8:6, 2 Corinthians 5:17, Ephesians 2:10, 15, Colossians 1:15-17, Hebrews 
1:1-3a) before John’s gospel circulated in final form, in “Jesus as Lord and Teacher,” 
John C. Cavadini and Laura Holt, editors, Who Do You Say That I Am? Confessing the 
Mystery of Christ (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004) 51-61 at 56. 
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That the Incarnation did not interrupt or halt the creating agency of the Logos is 
the gist of a brief reflection by Athanasius in On the Incarnation. Speaking of Jesus as 
the Logos incarnate Athanasius declared, 
For He was not, as might be imagined, circumscribed in the body, nor, 
while present in the body, was He absent elsewhere; nor, while He moved 
the body, was the universe left void of His working and Providence…, He 
was, without inconsistency, quickening the universe as well, and was in 
every process of nature, and was outside the whole, He was none the less 
manifest from the working of the universe as well.59 
The divine creating agency of the Logos, Athanasius says, did not cease at the 
Incarnation.   
Third, creating is the divine operation of the Logos least conceivable as an act 
and attribute of Jesus’ human nature.  The divine Logos’s mediating of the act of creation 
from the Father and with the Spirit cannot be transferred to, mediated by, participated in, 
or enacted by the human nature of Jesus. Jesus the Logos acted in and through his full, 
free humanity when he performed miracles of healing, when he changed water to wine at 
Cana, when he walked on the water or calmed the sea, when he forgave and remitted sins 
with divine authority, when he initiated the Lord’s Supper with an unheard of change in 
the sacred meal of the Pasch, when he breathed the Holy Spirit upon his disciples after 
the resurrection (John 20: 22-23).  These are referred to as Jesus’ theandric acts. 
Theandric acts can be conceived, as Aquinas did, in terms of a divine principal 
cause acting with and through a human instrumental cause in a combined causality 
producing an effect beyond the capacity of the human instrumental cause by itself. Jesus’ 
human subjectivity, freedom, imagination, speaking, etc are human realities able to be 
drawn into service of the divine operation of the Logos and bring about effects beyond 
																																																								
59 Athanasius, translated by Archibald Robertson, On the Incarnation in Philip Schaff and 
Henry Wace, editors, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 4 (Buffalo, 
NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1892.) Revised and edited for New Advent by 
Kevin Knight. http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2802.htm.  Accessed at 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2802.htm. 
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the capacity of his humanity and due to divine power. However, creating by the Logos 
cannot be a theandric activity in which the human nature of Jesus serves as instrumental 
cause for his divine nature and person as principal cause. 60  Part of Jesus’ human nature 
being human is being ‘created’. Being created means existing in constitutive difference 
from the creating source; creatures are not the Creator since they have come to be, and 
the Creator has brought them to be.  Jesus’ individual humanity shares the limits of all 
created reality. The created cannot create itself much less anything else. Jesus’ human 
nature was created through and exists in dependence on his creating act as Logos. 
Of course, both ‘human nature’ and ‘divine nature’ are heuristic concepts rather 
than comprehensive, closed definitions in Chalcedon. This means that whatever belongs 
to human nature, and we may not have understood what that is in completeness, is 
inherent in Christ’s human nature. Likewise, whatever pertains to God, divinity, and the 
Logos, and we have not come to the end of grasping what that is, belongs to the divine 
nature of Christ. The divine nature of the Logos is the Logos acting. We do receive as 
true, nonetheless, that according to the Prologue to the Gospel of John the Logos brings 
that which has come to be into being. Therefore, creating cannot be separated from 
Christ’s divine nature.  
When Chalcedon affirmed the “distinctive character of each nature being 
preserved,” it professed that the Logos did not lose anything proper to divinity by 
assuming a human nature. The divine kenosis described in Philippians 2: 6-11 refers to 
withholding manifestation of divinity, sovereignty, and power. Kenosis withheld a 
manifestation of divine effects, in the humanity of Jesus first of all, but was not loss of 
divinity.  If creating had been ‘left behind’, then the divine nature of the Logos would 
have changed because of the hypostatic union, just what Chalcedon rejected in affirming 
that each of the two natures remains unchanged, atreptos.   
																																																								
60 Aquinas denies that any creature can act principally or instrumentally in creating. See 
Thomas Aquinas, Latin text, English translation, Introduction, Notes, Appendices & 
Glossary by Thomas Gilby, O.P. Summa Theologiae, Volume 8, Creation, Variety and 
Evil (Ia.44-49) (Great Britian: Eyres & Spottiswoode Limited, 1967) Q. 45, a. 5: “…since 
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instrumental cause’s action…for creative action to be attributed to any creature is 
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Reflection on the act of creating by the Logos leads to recognizing that the 
Logos’s agency in creating is the divine act that is the ultimate principle of social justice. 
That is, and as the fourth step, Christ as incarnate Logos (ensarkos) acting universally 
(asarkos) in the power of his divine nature mediating the act of creation is the ultimate 
and universal principle of social justice for Christians and non-Christians alike.  All 
societies and all religions, not only Christianity, have seeds of social justice sown in their 
people by the Logos.  As Creator, the Logos always and everywhere is that on Whom all 
creation depends, and that from Whom human nature is constituted in self-presence, that 
is, in the natural light of human reason receives apart from the mission of Jesus. The 
universally and continually active Creator Logos who is Jesus the Christ cannot be other 
than, and nothing else can be, the immanent divine source of order in the cosmos and 
history. This pertains to human existence in its social dimension as well. 
Fifth, why so? Continuance in creating by Christ, the Logos-become-flesh, is an 
ordering principle because creation is not chaos, or rather, in contemporary understanding 
chaos has the potential for emergent order in accord with what Lonergan designates 
‘emergent probability’.61 The omnipresent, immanent activity of the Logos as Creator 
revealed in John’s Gospel implies that the Logos is also the source of order in creation, in 
whatever way order can be understood. Christ as creating Logos (asarkos) is the ultimate 
source of existence and order in all creation in its every dimension, including human 
socio-historical existence that also flows so obviously from very concrete, historically 
accessible human beings. The Logos creates everything that comes to be, including 
human beings who in their self-transcending acts of intentional consciousness directed 
toward the good of order are the proximate source of social justice. Creaturely 
dependence on the Logos extends to the human capacity to generate meaning, and so 
reaches to conscience and concern for the common good, for the well-being of all 
members of a society. That is the human inception of social justice.  That is, in creating 
humanity the Logos is the source also of the proximate ordering principle in a society. 
																																																								
61 The meaning of order in the physical universe will not be discussed here but has been a 
theme in dialogue between science and religion.  
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The concept of order probably has to be reclaimed from guilt by association with 
the concept of control and Lonergan does just this in chapter 2 of Method on the human 
good. He explains that in groups there is cooperation through institutions (family, mores, 
society, education, state, law, economy, technology, church) with defined and assigned 
roles and tasks carried out by individuals for the sake of the good of order.  Order, by 
contrast to an externally imposed unity, direction, and purpose we might say is a 
structured, intrinsic unity in multiple operations by an individual or a group. In an 
individual physical health and spontaneity is order. In a community, regular and 
successful cooperation for common objectives to the benefit of all and each is the good of 
order.   
The good of order in a society cannot be achieved by anti-institutional anarchy, by 
a single institution or person controlling all social authority, or by carefully designed 
institutions or policies that nevertheless don’t result in beneficial effects.  To the contrary, 
achieving the good of order depends on and instantiates, arguably and among other 
things, realizing a substantial degree of social justice. Social justice is crucial because the 
good of order involves the effective functioning of a society’s major institutions—state, 
economy, family, education, religion—for the benefit of the society’s members. Effective 
functioning cannot occur except in active contributions from, active participation by, the 
members of a society.   
Members’ contributions take place in myriad concrete activities such as, for 
example, earning a living without working seven days a week, exercising informed 
citizenship by discussion, voting, accepting jury duty, etc. living out positive family 
interactions as an education for life in the wider society, attaining an acceptable level of 
education enabling some participation in music, art, and culture. Today we would add 
that members of a society contribute to the common good by learning about and 
practicing ecological responsibility. Social justice deals with institutional impediments 
blocking access to making those contributions, to participation in those activities. 
Otherwise only some members of a society actively participate in the major institutions 
which in turn benefit some, excluding others. Exclusion is marginalization. Social justice 
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seeks to identify and overcome marginalization. Marginalization is a malfunction in one 
or more major institutions of a society.  
Lonergan developed principles for but did not apply his dialectical analysis 
directly and in detail to malfunctioning institutions, and in that sense he did not take up 
the problem of social justice. Robert Doran, however, has refined and applied Lonergan’s 
dialectics in Theology and the Dialectics of History. It may be that Doran’s signal gift to 
social justice is his relating of equitable sharing in vital values, a typical objective of 
social justice, upwards through community to culture and downwards from divine grace 
through culture and community to vital values. And yet, Doran’s analysis can be made 
more precise and closer to praxis. Doran’s dialectics become more precise when the 
scope of influence from cultural and social values upon distribution of vital values is 
more clearly seen to be not simply promoting just distribution of vital goods as 
distributive justice but extends to universal access to making active contributions. Social 
justice as understood in Catholic Social Teaching is primarily about securing access to 
making those contributions, and secondarily about distribution of resources to bring about 
conditions making that access possible.  
Then too Doran’s analysis would gain practical purchase if picked up by 
sociologists and political scientists. I would love to see some sociologists, for example, 
take Doran’s dialectics as a basis for framing empirically testable hypotheses for 
qualitative and quantitative research on cultural and not only on economic and political 
values at issue, whether positively or negatively, in a particular type of marginalization, 
that of young Black men from employment for example.  
Sixth, when human beings in any culture or religion act toward the common good 
in social justice an inconspicuous divine/human cooperation occurs rather than a 
Promethean assertion of human intent to remake society. In labors for a socially just 
society whose basic institutions serve the common good, the creating Logos and created 
human beings work together asymmetrically. The asymmetry comes from the dependent, 
participated existence on the human side of the cooperation.  
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Still, order in the realm of free individual and socially organized human activity is 
a matter of personal and common meaning, truth, and value. When practical attraction to 
justice emerges in people of any culture and language and begins to enter into individual 
and corporate decisions that originate and sustain mores, laws, institutions, and habits 
formed by justice, then justice has gained a foothold in the shaping of social existence. 
To that extent justice then becomes an ordering principle in human society in tension 
with injustice. As an ordering principle social justice as a public standard, as a societal 
objective, and as a personal virtue that apprehends, inquires, deliberates, decides, and acts 
toward the common good, has an inner affinity with the creating Logos. Seeking 
realization of just order and the common good by overcoming marginalization in any 
society aligns people with the creating, ordering Logos.  Human agency on behalf of the 
common good serves the purpose of the creating Logos even when that human agency 
has not been placed under the full effect of saving grace mediated by Jesus, the gospel, 
and Christianity and received in faith.  Christianity’s distinctive belief in Jesus of 
Nazareth as the divine, creating Logos does not lead into a walled enclave opposed to 
other religions but becomes an unshakeable Christian principle of support for 
interreligious dialogue and cooperation on behalf of racial and social justice. 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, faith in Christ, a gift beyond social justice, opens the believer to accepting 
all that Christ’s divine nature accomplishes beyond (asarkos) no less than in and through 
Jesus (ensarkos). But creating and ordering creation lies beyond the visible borders of 
what Christ’s humanity mediates in the economy of redemption. Social justice, 
accordingly, is both native to Christianity insofar as Christ’s words and deeds carry its 
meaning, and something for Christians to discover, appreciate, encourage, and cooperate 
with in plural modalities original to other religions and cultures. Religions other than 
Christianity also locate conscience and social justice in the divine/human relationship.62 
Christians agree with many Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and other religious people, 
																																																								
62 For select texts from various religions, with articles and excerpts that all bear on 
connections between religions and social justice, see Roger S. Gottlieb, Liberating Faith: 
Religious Voices for Justice, Peace & Ecological Wisdom (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003).   
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no less than with people at a distance from any religion, that slave labor, racism, heedless 
destruction of the environment, absence of universal health care where resources are 
available, lack of gender equity, and destitution in the midst of affluence offend human 
dignity and are types of social injustice. 
The challenge social justice presents to Christian faith is Christological as well as 
ethical.  The Christological challenge is to let faith in Christ be stirred to expand its scope 
from the visible economy of redemption centered in Jesus to affirmative cooperation with 
the universal action of the Logos to be sought in dialogue with adherents of other 
religions, or none. Christian faith, that is, does not stop at the limits of Christ’s humanity 
and of Christianity but casts its obedient gaze to everything coming from his divine 
nature too, including creating and ordering within human history under the influence of 
self-transcendence in intentional consciousness.  
The Christological premise for indifference or resistance to social justice is either 
a tacit ‘Nestorian’ separation between the divine and human natures of Jesus, as if not 
joined in the person of the Word/Logos, or a view, perhaps an extreme kenoticism, of 
Christ’s divine nature as having changed in the Incarnation by losing or alienating the 
divine power to create. Contrarily, to accept Chalcedon is to accept the inseparability of 
faith in Jesus from discipleship involving commitment to the social justice the Creator 
Logos continually labors to bring about. Further, Chalcedonian dogma is the 
Christological ground for an impulse and mandate arising within faith for seeking 
dialogue and cooperation with any who also promote social justice that institutionalizes 
human self-transcendence, a self-transcendence Christians believe is due to the Creator 
Logos through Whom all has come to be that has come to be.  
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